Tentara Chu

Tentara Chu (Hanzi: 楚勇; Pinyin: Chǔ Yǒng; harfiah: 'para pemberani Chu (negara)') adalah pasukan regional tetap yang diorganisasikan oleh Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠). Nama ini diambil dari wilayah Hunan tempat Tentara ini dibesarkan. Tentara dibiayai melalui para bangsawan dan golongan elite setempat, sebagai lawan terhadap pemerintah pusat.

Tentara Xiang adalah salah satu dari dua tentara yang dikenal sebagai Tentara Hunan. Tentara Hunan lain, yang disebut Tentara Xiang, dibentuk oleh Zeng Guofan untuk bertempur dalam Pemberontakan Taiping. Sisa-sisa Tentara Xiang yang juga bertempur dalam perang itu kemudian disebut "Tentara Hunan Tua".

Pemberontakan Dungan (1862–1877)

Tentara Xiang adalah bagian dari serangkaian pasukan asli baru yang disebut "Yung-ying" dalam Dinasti Qing Tiongkok, terpisah dari Delapan Panji dan Tentara Standar Hijau Manchu. Poin utama perbedaanya adalah dalam afiliasi regional mereka, karena pasukan ini sering dibesarkan dan dipimpin melalui hubungan kekerabatan dan jaringan lokal; dan pertentangan mereka terhadap kebijakan militer Tiongkok yang normal dengan para jenderal militer sering dirotasi untuk mencegah komandan ambisius membangun pangkalan-pangkalan kekuasaan. Dalam kasus "yung-ying" ini, kebutuhan akan kohesi unit berarti bahwa para perwira diangkat oleh komandan dan tetap memegang komando unit mereka sepanjang keseluruhan kampanye.^[1]

Jenderal Zuo Zongtang memimpin Tentara Hunan dalam pemberontakan Dungan, pada Desember 1872 mengirim 3.000 dari mereka ke Suzhou di Gansu.^[2]

Di Hunan, cendekiawan sastra mengalami "militerisasi", dan lebih banyak orang biasa mendaftar sebagai perwira dalam ketentaraan.^[3]

Zuo menghimpun 55.000 tentara pria dari Hunan sebelum dia memulai serangan terakhir untuk merebut kembali Gansu dari para pemberontak Dungan, mereka berpartisipasi bersama dengan pasukan regional lainnya (pasukan Sichuan, Anhui, dan Henan juga bergabung dalam pertempuran ini).^[4]

Tentara Hunan secara ekstensif disusupi oleh perkumpulan rahasia anti-Qing, Gelaohui, yang memulai beberapa pemberontakan selama pemberontakan Dungan, menunda serangan-serangan krusial. Zuo memadamkan pemberontakan dan mengeksekusi mereka yang terlibat.^[5]

Komandan Tentara Hunan lainnya selama pemberontakan adalah Manchu To-lung-a (Dolonga), yang telah dipindahkan dari panji Manchu. Kepemimpinannya atas pasukan Hunan mengalahkan para pemberontak Muslim dan benar-benar menghancurkan posisi mereka di provinsi Shaanxi, mengusir mereka ke Gansu.^[6]

Komandan lain di bawah To-long-a adalah Lei Cheng-kuan, yang berjuang dengan sukses melawan para pemberontak, memungkinkan jalan Gansu dibuka kembali setelah merebut kota-kota penting.^[7]

Pemimpin utama

Zuo Zongtang

Lihat pula

Tuanlian

Referensi

^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 202. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. By the end of the Nien War in 1868, a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security. Often referred to by historians as regional armies, these forces were generally described at the time as yung-ying (lit. 'brave battalions'). In the 1860s, such forces throughout all the empire totalled more than 300,000 men, They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün) founded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the resuscitated Hunan Army (usually called Ch'u-chün) under Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chün) coordinated by Li Hung-chang. There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yü-chün), Shantung, (Tung-chün), Yunnan (Tien-chün) and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chün). These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain. More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society. Both the strength and the weakness of the yung-ying were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between the higher and lower officers and between officers and men. In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies - both the banner forces and the Green Standard Army.
^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 234. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. Tso Tsung-t'ang moved into his governor-general's seat at Lanchow in August 1872. . . But Tso concentraded first on Hsi-ning, 120 miles north-west of Lanchow, especially because in 1872 it was under the control of Shensi Muslim leaders, including Pai Yen-hu who had been Ma Hua-ling's partisan and now had more than 10,000 seasoned Muslim fighters at his disposal. The task of attacking Hsi-ning was undertaken by Liu Chin-t'ang in August. It took Liu three months to penetrate the difficult and well-defended terrain into Hsi-ning, but he prevailed at last. He annihilated the 10,000 Muslim partisans, but Pai Yen-hu escaped. Ma Kuei-yuan, the 'Muslim gentry leader' of Hsi-ning who protected the New Teaching, was tracked down in the Tsinghai Salar territory.81. . . .All this time Tso had in fact been preparing for the crucial assault on Su-chou, where the New Teaching commander Ma Wen-lu (originally form Hsi-ning) numerous tungan leaders had gathered. To add to Hsu Chan-piao's forces, Tso sent to Su-chou 3,000 men from his own Hunan Army in December 1872, and at his request both Sung Ch'ing and chang Yueh of the Honan Army were ordered by the throne to join the campaign. Chin-shun, the recently appointed general-in-chief at Uliasutai, also participated. Tso had his hands full arranging finances and supplies, including the establishment of a modest arsenal at Lanchow where Lai Ch'ang, a Cantonese and a talented army officer with some knowledge of ardnance, began manufacturing extra shells for the German siege guns.82 Tso was obsessed with the organization of the war, yet both conscience and policy called for making arrangements for the livelihood of 'good Muslims', with a view to removing the root causes of communal conflict.
^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 540. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. the cases of Hunan particulartly illustrates this widespread militarization of the scholar class. . .Such was also the case of Liu Ming-ch'uan who rose form smuggling salt to leading an army in Anhwei, and finally to the governorship of the province of Taiwan (see chapter 4). . . Until 1856 most of the officers of the Hunan Army were scholars, The proportion dropped sharply for commissions given after this date. . . Holders of official titles and degrees accounted for only 12 per cent of the military command of the Huai Army, and at most a third of the core of the Huai clique, that is the trop commanders of the eleven army corps.
^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 226. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. Tso's preparations for his offensive in Kansu were nearly complete. From Hunan, his veteran officers had recruited a new force totalling some 55,000 men. In addition, Tseng Kuo-fan had transferred to Shensi in 1867 the only unit of his Hunan Army that was not disbanded - about 10,000 men under Liu Sung-shan, one of Tseng's best generals. The throne had also assigned to Tso's command 10,000 men from the Szechawn Army (Ch'uan-chün) under Huang Ting; 7,000 men of the Anhwei provincial army (Wan-chün) under Kuo Pao-ch'ang; and 6,500 men of the Honan Army (Yü-chün) under Chang Yueh. These forces all had experience in fighting the Taipings of the Niens, and they included a total of 7,500 cavalry, reinforcing the 5,000 mounts Tso himself procured.55 However, apart from employing Manchu officers from Kirin to instruct his cavalry. Tso seems to have paid little attention to the training of his forces. He appreciated the fact that Liu Sung-shan's troops were adept in tactical formations and in sharpshooting. But from his own experience in the Taiping Rebellion, Tso was convinced that the two essentials for victory were courageous men and ample rations.
^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 230. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. The most serious crisis was internal, for in March and April 1869, at the same time as the victory at Tung-chih-yuan, two alarming mutinies occurred in the best forces under Tso's command. In late March, after Liu Sung-shan had cut through northern Shensi and approached the Kansu-Ninghsia border, a mutiny took place at Sui-te (about seventy-five miles north-east of Yenan), where he had left behind 4,500 troops to guard a supply depot. Several hundred troops, including those who later confessed to being members of the Elder Brothers Society (Ko-lao hui), robbed the grain depot and took control of Sui-te city. Among the mutineers were as many as four company officers, also said to be Elder Brother members.66 The revolt was quickly suppressed after Liu himself hurried back to Sui-te in early April, but meanwhile, an apparently unrelated mutiny had broken out in I-chün in central Shensi, eight miles north of Sian, involving the murder of a t'ung-ling commander. Again the several hundred rebellious soldiers included members of the Elder Brothers Society. Four company officers and a battalion officer who joined them were also said to be members. The mutineers were captured, however, by Tso's loyal forces. Tso personally executed five of the ringleaders. He believed that the Elder Brothers Society had originated in Szechwan and Kweichow but had affected the Hunan Army through surrender Taipings who were natives of these two provinces, or through 'disbanded mercenaries' (san-yung) of other provinces who had come to Shensi for adventure. He hoped that such 'venomous and devilishly elusive creatures' were very few among his forces/67 However, the Elder Brothers Society was long to persist in Tso's armies, as an underground mutual aid group performing both legal and illegal deeds. Interrupted by the mutinies and their aftermath, operations against Chin-chi-pao were not resumed until mid-August. Liu Sung-shan, advancing from northern Shensi, reached the vicinity of Ling-chou in early September. Ma Hua-lung probably had no illusions about his own power as compared with Tso's. He wrote to Tso and negotiated for peace, but his overture was firmly rejected.68 In November, Ling-chou was occupied by Liu Sung-shan; Tso's forces in the south, having captured such cities as Ku-yuan, moved continuously northward,
^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 218. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. The Ch'ing began to win only with the arrival of To-lung-a (1817–64) as imperial commissioner. Originally a Manchu banner officer, To-lung-a had, through the patronage of Hu Lin-i, risen to be a commander of the Hunan Army (the force under him being identified as the Ch'u-yung).40 In 1861, To-lung-a helped Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to recover Anking from the Taipings and, on his own, captured Lu-chou in 1862. His yung-ying force proved to be equally effective against the Muslims. In March 1863, his battalions captured two market towns that formed the principal Tungan base in eastern Shensi. He broke the blockade around Sian in August and pursued the Muslims to western Shensi. By the time of his death in March 1864, in a battle against Szechwanese Taipings who invaded Shensi, he had broken the back of the Muslim Rebellion in that province. A great man Shensi Muslims had, however, escaped to Kansu, adding to the numerous Muslim forces which had already risen there.
^ John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 219. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. In mid-1864, Lei Cheng-kuan, a Hunan Army officer who had come with To-lung-a to Shensi and now fought in Kansu, captured both Ku-yuan and P'ing-liang, with the result that government highways were re-opened between the Wei River and western and central Kansu.

Draf Sejarah Qing

[1] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 202. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. By the end of the Nien War in 1868, a new kind of military force had emerged as the Ch'ing dynasty's chief bulwark of security. Often referred to by historians as regional armies, these forces were generally described at the time as yung-ying (lit. 'brave battalions'). In the 1860s, such forces throughout all the empire totalled more than 300,000 men, They included the remnants of the old Hunan Army (Hsiang-chün) founded by Tseng Kuo-fan, the resuscitated Hunan Army (usually called Ch'u-chün) under Tso Tsung-t'ang, and the Anhwei Army (Huai-chün) coordinated by Li Hung-chang. There were also smaller forces of a similar nature in Honan (Yü-chün), Shantung, (Tung-chün), Yunnan (Tien-chün) and Szechwan (Ch'uan-chün). These forces were distinguished generally by their greater use of Western weapons and they were more costly to maintain. More fundamentally they capitalized for military purposes on the particularistic loyalties of the traditional society. Both the strength and the weakness of the yung-ying were to be found in the close personal bonds that were formed between the higher and lower officers and between officers and men. In this respect they differed from the traditional Ch'ing imperial armies - both the banner forces and the Green Standard Army.

[2] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 234. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. Tso Tsung-t'ang moved into his governor-general's seat at Lanchow in August 1872. . . But Tso concentraded first on Hsi-ning, 120 miles north-west of Lanchow, especially because in 1872 it was under the control of Shensi Muslim leaders, including Pai Yen-hu who had been Ma Hua-ling's partisan and now had more than 10,000 seasoned Muslim fighters at his disposal. The task of attacking Hsi-ning was undertaken by Liu Chin-t'ang in August. It took Liu three months to penetrate the difficult and well-defended terrain into Hsi-ning, but he prevailed at last. He annihilated the 10,000 Muslim partisans, but Pai Yen-hu escaped. Ma Kuei-yuan, the 'Muslim gentry leader' of Hsi-ning who protected the New Teaching, was tracked down in the Tsinghai Salar territory.81. . . .All this time Tso had in fact been preparing for the crucial assault on Su-chou, where the New Teaching commander Ma Wen-lu (originally form Hsi-ning) numerous tungan leaders had gathered. To add to Hsu Chan-piao's forces, Tso sent to Su-chou 3,000 men from his own Hunan Army in December 1872, and at his request both Sung Ch'ing and chang Yueh of the Honan Army were ordered by the throne to join the campaign. Chin-shun, the recently appointed general-in-chief at Uliasutai, also participated. Tso had his hands full arranging finances and supplies, including the establishment of a modest arsenal at Lanchow where Lai Ch'ang, a Cantonese and a talented army officer with some knowledge of ardnance, began manufacturing extra shells for the German siege guns.82 Tso was obsessed with the organization of the war, yet both conscience and policy called for making arrangements for the livelihood of 'good Muslims', with a view to removing the root causes of communal conflict.

[3] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 540. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. the cases of Hunan particulartly illustrates this widespread militarization of the scholar class. . .Such was also the case of Liu Ming-ch'uan who rose form smuggling salt to leading an army in Anhwei, and finally to the governorship of the province of Taiwan (see chapter 4). . . Until 1856 most of the officers of the Hunan Army were scholars, The proportion dropped sharply for commissions given after this date. . . Holders of official titles and degrees accounted for only 12 per cent of the military command of the Huai Army, and at most a third of the core of the Huai clique, that is the trop commanders of the eleven army corps.

[4] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 226. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. Tso's preparations for his offensive in Kansu were nearly complete. From Hunan, his veteran officers had recruited a new force totalling some 55,000 men. In addition, Tseng Kuo-fan had transferred to Shensi in 1867 the only unit of his Hunan Army that was not disbanded - about 10,000 men under Liu Sung-shan, one of Tseng's best generals. The throne had also assigned to Tso's command 10,000 men from the Szechawn Army (Ch'uan-chün) under Huang Ting; 7,000 men of the Anhwei provincial army (Wan-chün) under Kuo Pao-ch'ang; and 6,500 men of the Honan Army (Yü-chün) under Chang Yueh. These forces all had experience in fighting the Taipings of the Niens, and they included a total of 7,500 cavalry, reinforcing the 5,000 mounts Tso himself procured.55 However, apart from employing Manchu officers from Kirin to instruct his cavalry. Tso seems to have paid little attention to the training of his forces. He appreciated the fact that Liu Sung-shan's troops were adept in tactical formations and in sharpshooting. But from his own experience in the Taiping Rebellion, Tso was convinced that the two essentials for victory were courageous men and ample rations.

[5] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 230. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. The most serious crisis was internal, for in March and April 1869, at the same time as the victory at Tung-chih-yuan, two alarming mutinies occurred in the best forces under Tso's command. In late March, after Liu Sung-shan had cut through northern Shensi and approached the Kansu-Ninghsia border, a mutiny took place at Sui-te (about seventy-five miles north-east of Yenan), where he had left behind 4,500 troops to guard a supply depot. Several hundred troops, including those who later confessed to being members of the Elder Brothers Society (Ko-lao hui), robbed the grain depot and took control of Sui-te city. Among the mutineers were as many as four company officers, also said to be Elder Brother members.66 The revolt was quickly suppressed after Liu himself hurried back to Sui-te in early April, but meanwhile, an apparently unrelated mutiny had broken out in I-chün in central Shensi, eight miles north of Sian, involving the murder of a t'ung-ling commander. Again the several hundred rebellious soldiers included members of the Elder Brothers Society. Four company officers and a battalion officer who joined them were also said to be members. The mutineers were captured, however, by Tso's loyal forces. Tso personally executed five of the ringleaders. He believed that the Elder Brothers Society had originated in Szechwan and Kweichow but had affected the Hunan Army through surrender Taipings who were natives of these two provinces, or through 'disbanded mercenaries' (san-yung) of other provinces who had come to Shensi for adventure. He hoped that such 'venomous and devilishly elusive creatures' were very few among his forces/67 However, the Elder Brothers Society was long to persist in Tso's armies, as an underground mutual aid group performing both legal and illegal deeds. Interrupted by the mutinies and their aftermath, operations against Chin-chi-pao were not resumed until mid-August. Liu Sung-shan, advancing from northern Shensi, reached the vicinity of Ling-chou in early September. Ma Hua-lung probably had no illusions about his own power as compared with Tso's. He wrote to Tso and negotiated for peace, but his overture was firmly rejected.68 In November, Ling-chou was occupied by Liu Sung-shan; Tso's forces in the south, having captured such cities as Ku-yuan, moved continuously northward,

[6] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 218. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. Diakses tanggal 2012-01-18. The Ch'ing began to win only with the arrival of To-lung-a (1817–64) as imperial commissioner. Originally a Manchu banner officer, To-lung-a had, through the patronage of Hu Lin-i, risen to be a commander of the Hunan Army (the force under him being identified as the Ch'u-yung).40 In 1861, To-lung-a helped Tseng Kuo-ch'üan to recover Anking from the Taipings and, on his own, captured Lu-chou in 1862. His yung-ying force proved to be equally effective against the Muslims. In March 1863, his battalions captured two market towns that formed the principal Tungan base in eastern Shensi. He broke the blockade around Sian in August and pursued the Muslims to western Shensi. By the time of his death in March 1864, in a battle against Szechwanese Taipings who invaded Shensi, he had broken the back of the Muslim Rebellion in that province. A great man Shensi Muslims had, however, escaped to Kansu, adding to the numerous Muslim forces which had already risen there.

[7] John King Fairbank; Kwang-Ching Liu; Denis Crispin Twitchett, ed. (1980). Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911. Volume 11, Part 2 of The Cambridge History of China Series (edisi ke-illustrated). Cambridge University Press. hlm. 219. ISBN 0-521-22029-7. In mid-1864, Lei Cheng-kuan, a Hunan Army officer who had come with To-lung-a to Shensi and now fought in Kansu, captured both Ku-yuan and P'ing-liang, with the result that government highways were re-opened between the Wei River and western and central Kansu.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]