First Defensive Battle of Don
Part of Italian–Soviet War
Italo Gariboldi commanding the newly formed 8th Army in Russia, during the First Defensive Battle of Don
Date 20 August – 1 September 1942 Location Don region, modern day Russia 47°05′11″N 39°14′19″E / 47.08639°N 39.23861°E / 47.08639; 39.23861 Result Italian victory[1][2][3]
Belligerents
Kingdom of Italy	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Giovanni Messe Italo Gariboldi	Andrey Yeryomenko Vasily Gordov
Casualties and losses
900 killed 4200 wounded[4]	Unknown

The First Defensive Battle of the Don also known as First Battle of Don, is the term adopted by Italian historiography to define the harsh and difficult battles fought by the forces of the 8th Army deployed on the Don front in Russia in the summer of 1942 during the Italian campaign in Russia on the Eastern Front of the Second World War. The battle originated from the violent attack launched by Soviet divisions along the course of the Don held by the aggressor Italian troops; initially, some units of the 8th Army were put in difficulty and ceded important bridgeheads on the western bank of the river, at Serafimovič and Verčne Mamon; there were also collapses and panic among the units of the 2nd Infantry Division "Sforzesca", confirming German fears about the weakness of the Italian forces. Subsequently, with the influx of military units to cover the gap and defend the 9th Infantry Division "Pasubio" and the 3rd Infantry Division "Ravenna", the Italian units fought well and succeeded, even without reconquering all the lost positions, in stopping the Soviet advance.

The First Battle of the Don included the cavalry charge at Isbuschenskij, one of the last such actions in the war. The battle had important strategic consequences, it was from the positions it had reached in August that the Red Army would unleash its major winter offensives (Operation Uranus and Operation Little Saturn), achieving a decisive victory. Furthermore, the initial defeat sparked a heated controversy over responsibility between the German and Italian commands, which contributed to depressing the morale of the ARMIR soldiers and further weakened mutual trust between the main Axis Powers.

In the summer of 1942, the powerful German forces in the southern sector of the Eastern Front, grouped in Army Group B under General Maximilian von Weichs and Army Group A under Field Marshal Wilhelm List, were advancing rapidly in depth and, after overcoming weak resistance from the Soviet forces, were simultaneously moving towards the two strategic objectives designated by Adolf Hitler in the plan for Case Blue. While Field Marshal List's divisions were advancing towards the Caucasus, General Weichs's troops, in particular General Friedrich Paulus's 6th Army, were approaching the great bend of the Don to attack the important city of Stalingrad. The Wehrmacht 's strategic situation seemed excellent, and the Red Army was apparently showing signs of weakening; in reality, the diverging advance of the two German army groups risked exhausting the available logistical resources and was dangerously exposing the ever-expanding left flank of Army Group B. This sector of the front, linked to the Don River, was exposed to possible Soviet counterattacks that could jeopardize the communications of General Paulus's troops. According to German planning, this long sector of the river, stretching from Voronezh to the Don bend, was to be entrusted to the so-called "satellite" armies of the Axis allies, consisting of poorly mobile, insufficiently armed, and poorly trained formations, to which the German command intended to assign only defensive tasks.^[5]

Thus, while the German 2nd Army was deployed at Voronezh to defend this northern bastion, the Hungarian 2nd Army took up position along the Don to the south of this city, while between Pavlovsk and Serafimovič, on the left of the German 6th Army, the Italian 8th Army was to be deployed in defence, in the process of making a difficult advance from the Donets River to the Don.^[6]

Since the summer of 1941, Mussolini had hypothesised a clear strengthening of the Italian contingent on the Eastern front, important in his opinion for reasons of prestige but also to take part in the advance into the heart of Russian territory and in the Caucasian region from which it was possible to hope to obtain large quantities of raw materials and supplies, useful for strengthening the Italian military apparatus. In January 1942, even Hitler, initially sceptical about Italian participation in the campaign in the East, made pressing requests to the Duce to obtain an increase in Italian formations in Russia, essential to make up for the serious losses suffered by the German forces during the Battle of Moscow and the harsh winter campaign.^[7]

Therefore, from 1 May 1942 the command of the 8th Army was established, entrusted to General Italo Gariboldi , which would absorb the divisions of the CSIR, transformed into the XXXV Army Corps still under the command of General Giovanni Messe , integrated by the new formations of the 2nd Army Corps and the Alpine Army Corps.^[8] The forces of the 8th Army (also known as ARMIR) were activated in Russia on 9 July 1942, when Case Blue was already in full swing, and were initially split into two groups: the II and XXXV Army Corps marching towards the Don and the Alpine Army Corps at the disposal of Army Group A to participate in the offensive in the Caucasus. In fact, on August 19, the Alpine Army Corps was also assigned to the command of General Gariboldi, given that the commander of the 8th Army preferred to maintain the unity of all his formations and also because the use of the Alpine troops in the Caucasus, whose conquest by the excellent German mountain divisions was believed to be imminent, seemed unnecessary.^[9][10]

Between 13 and 16 August, the divisions of the 8th Army took control of the defense along the Don between Pavlovsk and the confluence of the Khoper. In reality, since the end of July, the 3rd Infantry Division "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta" had been brought to the front line by the command of Army Group B to take part, together with the German 79th Infantry Division, part of the 17th Army Corps of the 6th Army, in the attack to try to destroy Serafimovich's dangerous Soviet bridgehead south of the Don. The Italian division, reinforced by a German regiment, took part in fierce and prolonged fighting that continued until mid-August: the Soviet bridgehead, after alternating phases of attacks and counterattacks, was reduced but not completely conquered, and Soviet forces maintained some positions south of the river. The 3rd Celere Division, which fought bravely, suffered heavy losses (over 1,700 dead and wounded) and was then withdrawn on 15 August from the front line, where the "Sforzesca" Division was deployed, for a period of rest and reorganisation in the rear.^[11]

While the 8th Army was taking up its defensive position along the Don, the German 6th Army successfully resumed its offensive in the direction of Stalingrad and during the first half of August 1942 overcame the stubborn resistance of the Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies and reached the bend of the Don in force, establishing bridgeheads for a march towards the Volga. The situation of the Red Army seemed truly critical and worsened further in the following days on 23 August the German armoured units advanced directly to the Volga which they reached north of Stalingrad, the rapid conquest of which seemed imminent. While the 6th Army was achieving these spectacular successes and was advancing further and further east, Stalin and the Soviet high command, however, had not given up on resisting and even counterattacking right along the Don line, defended by the Allied armies, in order to threaten the German communications and slow down their advance.^[12]

From 13 to 18 August, the armies of the Voronezh Front (General Nikolai Vatutin) and those of the Stalingrad Front (General Andrei Erëmenko ) launched a series of strong attacks that put the Axis defenses in difficulty; the Soviets failed to make strategic breakthroughs but with their costly counterattacks they gained valuable bridgeheads south of the Don. In the Hungarian sector, the Soviet 40th Army managed to establish a position west of the river at Korotojak (from where the overwhelming Ostrogorzk-Rossosh Offensive would later launch in January 1943), while further south, on the right of the Italians, the 1st Guards Army attacked the German 17th Corps and crossed the Don at Kremenskaya , obtaining a second bridgehead. Finally, on August 20, while the panzers were marching towards the Volga, the Italian XXXV Army Corps of General Giovanni Messe was also attacked by divisions of the 63rd Army and the 21st Army of the Stalingrad Front.^[13][14]

The sector of the Don Line attacked by the Soviets had been defended for a few days by the "Sforzesca" Division which, not having had enough time to organize an effective defensive system and being inexperienced on the Eastern Front, was particularly vulnerable and garrisoned the positions west of Serafimovič with only two infantry regiments.^[15] The attack of the 63rd Soviet Army, launched mainly by units of the 197th Rifle Division, after crossing the Don, therefore put the Italian defenses in difficulty. In particular, the 54th Infantry Regiment, deployed on the right flank in the Bobrovski sector already partially occupied by the Soviets, showed signs of weakness and had to retreat. On 21 and 22 August the Soviet offensive extended to the left flank, defended by the 53rd Regiment; The Sforzesca units were forced to retreat to a more rearward line centred on the two strongholds of Jagodnij and Čebotarevskij to block the access routes through the valleys of the Krisaja and Zuzkan rivers which could have allowed the enemy to make a deep breakthrough.^[16] The retreat took place in confusion and there were signs of panic; in particular the battalions of the 54th regiment disintegrated, and only the disorganised remnants reached the new positions around Ceboratevskij.^[17]

The 8th Army command had to intervene to avoid a collapse and support the XXXV Army Corps; therefore the Celere Division, although exhausted by previous operations, had to flow back to the front line, together with the "Monte Cervino" Alpine Ski Battalion , the Croatian Legion and the 179th German Grenadier Regiment, sent by the 17th Army Corps to reinforce the 9th Infantry Division "Pasubio" , which in turn was attacked on the left of the Sforzesca. On 23 August, the day of the arrival of General Hans-Valentin Hube's panzers on the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, General Messe organised a counterattack to cover the retreat of the Sforzesca and contain the Soviet advance; The attempts of the units of the Celere Division and the German regiment were unsuccessful, while the courageous charges of the Italian cavalry regiments, in particular the action of the Savoia Cavalleria at Isbuscenskij, at least achieved the result of disorganising some Soviet rifle battalions and slowing down the enemy concentration in the Serafimovič bridgehead.^[18]

On 24 August the two Soviet armies of the Stalingrad Front resumed their attacks in force, especially on the left flank of the precarious Italian deployment; three rifle divisions pushed back the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment of the Celere Division, approached the stronghold of Jagodnij and conquered Chebotarevsky, dislodging the remains of the 54th Regiment and a group of Blackshirts. On 25 and 26 August the Italian situation seemed to worsen further, the Soviets had now cut off communications between the XXXV Army Corps and the German 17th Army Corps and, attacking along the Krisaja River, were also threatening Jagodnij.^[19] Furthermore, during the night of 25 August the Command of Army Group B, worried by the situation and by the news of the Italian collapse, decided to entrust the direction of the operations to General Hollidt, commander of the 17th Corps, to whom the divisions of the Italian XXXV Army Corps were also subjected. This decision immediately raised protests from General Messe and was withdrawn after 48 hours, after much controversy and recrimination between the two sides. In the meantime the influx of new reserves (a battalion of Bersaglieri and an Alpine regiment of the 2nd Alpine Division "Tridentina") allowed the Italian forces to avoid a strategic disaster.^[20]

The new Soviet attack in force, led by the 14th Guards Rifle Division and the 203rd Rifle Division, launched along the Krisaja valley, achieved some initial successes, causing great alarm in the command, but the arrival of new units of the Rapid Division, the intervention of the cavalry regiments and the resistance of the strongholds of Jagodnij and Gorbatovskij finally allowed the situation to be stabilized on the Bolšoj-Jagodnij line. On the evening of 26 August the Soviets interrupted the attacks and deployed on the important tactical positions reached south of the Don.^[21]

Faced with the precarious tactical situation in the Serafimovich bridgehead, the command of Army Group B decided to launch on 1 September a combined counterattack by German formations and the Alpine battalions "Vestone" and "Valchiese", supported by two platoons of L6 tanks, in the direction of Kotovsky. The attack, conducted with poor coordination, was overall a failure and the Soviets (four rifle divisions) held their valuable positions in the bridgehead which had been significantly expanded between Jagodnij and Bolšoj.^[22]

While the fighting was fiercely going on west of Serafimovič, on 22 and 23 August other Soviet units had also attacked the 3rd Infantry Division "Ravenna", deployed further north along the middle Don: the division lost ground and the enemy was able to establish a new bridgehead at Osetrovka, in the dangerous bend of Verčne Mamon l. Despite new attacks, the Soviets were unable to advance further, thanks also to the intervention in support of the Ravenna by units of the nearby Cosseria Division, but the important position reached south of the river would have allowed the totally successful launch of Operation Little Saturn in December which would have determined the defeat of the 8th Army.^[23]

The First Defensive Battle of the Don thus ended with the loss of positions on the western bank of the river and cost the units involved heavy losses: the XXXV Army Corps had over 800 killed, 3,900 wounded and 1,700 missing, while the II Army Corps recorded 72 killed and 300 wounded. However, the Soviet rifle divisions, engaged with little artillery and tank support, also suffered heavy losses and were forced to break off their attacks without having achieved a strategic success.^[4]

As far as the Italian forces were concerned, these operations highlighted the precariousness of the positions on the river and their vulnerability to attacks in force, convincing the Red Army to plan more important operations against the flanks, defended by the "satellite" units, of the German forces engaged in Stalingrad.^[24] Furthermore, the battle provoked a serious crisis in the relations between the Italians and the Germans due to the initial serious defeat of the Sforzesca and the disintegration of some units of this division.^[25] The Wehrmacht commands, sceptical (like Hitler himself) about the capabilities of the Italian command and troops, considered it essential to have their own command structures intervene to save the situation, without worrying about the reactions of the Italian generals. This resulted in a significant loss of mutual trust and of the "brotherhood of arms" between the Axis Powers. ^{[citation needed]}

General Messe, deeply irritated by the German behaviour and also because of disagreements with General Gariboldi, asked for and obtained a recall to his homeland and then left the command of the XXXV Army Corps. The German command tried to smooth over the differences but, worried about the Don sector, sent General Kurt von Tippelskirch as German liaison officer to the 8th Army with full powers of supervision and control, accentuating the resentment of the Italian generals.^[26]

In mid-October, the Italian divisions deployed in the Serafimovič bridgehead were transferred further north and left the sector to the arriving Romanian forces. On 19 November, the overwhelming Operation Uranus would begin from the very sector of the bridgehead conquered by the Soviets during the First Defensive Battle of the Don, which would rout the Romanian defences and trigger the sequence of events that would end with the total defeat of the Axis at Stalingrad and in the entire southern region of the Eastern Front And a month later, the Red Army broke through the Italian defensive front right at the bridgehead near the Verčne Mamon bend, manned by the Ravenna division.^[27]

• Operation Little Saturn
• Battle of Stalingrad